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Economists generally agree that the accumulation of public capital is an
important factor in raising living standards and improving long-run pro-
d u c t i v i t y. As Keynes recognized long ago, public investment, at some
critical share of total investment, can dampen the amplitude of business
cycles. Because the benefits from investment in transportation, educa-
tion, health, the environment, and other such projects are inhere n t l y
public in nature, federal government involvement in undertaking pro-
jects or in subsidizing them is a long-standing feature of public finance
in this country and elsewhere.
State and local governments play a major role in public capital accumu-
lation. The federal government subsidizes that role directly by grants
and, to a significant degree, indirectly through the tax exemption of
interest payments on municipal bonds. However, in spite of the widely
recognized importance of public investment and federal involvement,
discussion of financing public capital through tax-exempt bonds has
been confined to narrow academic and policy circles. In this brief,
Policy Advisor Edward V. Regan demystifies the current system, exposes
its weaknesses, and presents an alternative.
Regan finds the current system of tax exemption to be both ineff i c i e n t
and inequitable. It is inefficient because the borrowing costs of state and
local governments are not reduced by the full amount of the federal sub-
s i d y. It is inequitable because the portion of the federal subsidy that never
reaches state and local governments accrues to the wealthiest investors.
This undesirable state of affairs arises because the primary municipal
bond market (consisting of high-bracket taxpayers looking mainly for tax
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Preface
Economists generally agree that the accumulation of public capital is an important factor in
raising living standards and improving long-run productivity. As Keynes recognized long ago,
public investment, at some critical share of total investment, can dampen the amplitude of
business cycles. Because the benefits from investment in transportation, education, health,
the environment, and other such projects are inherently public in nature, federal govern-
ment involvement in undertaking projects or in subsidizing them is a long-standing feature
of public finance in this country and elsewhere.
State and local governments play a major role in public capital accumulation. The federal
government subsidizes that role directly by grants and, to a significant degree, indirectly
through the tax exemption of interest payments on municipal bonds. However, in spite of
the widely recognized importance of public investment and federal involvement, discussion
of financing public capital through tax-exempt bonds has been confined to narrow academic
and policy circles. In this brief, Policy Advisor Edward N. Regan demystifies the current sys-
tem, exposes its weaknesses, and presents an alternative.
Regan finds the current system of tax exemption to be both inefficient and inequitable. It is
inefficient because the borrowing costs of state and local governments are not reduced by the
full amount of the federal subsidy. It is inequitable because the portion of the federal subsidy
that never reaches state and local governments accrues to the wealthiest investors. This
undesirable state of affairs arises because the primary municipal bond market (consisting of
high-bracket taxpayers looking mainly for tax shelter) is not broad enough to supply the
financing needs of municipalities. Consequently, they must raise the yield on municipal
bonds relative to the yield on taxable bonds to attract investors from lower tax brackets,
thereby providing windfall gains to the wealthier investors.
Regan also argues that because of regulations governing large institutional investors’ partici-
pation in the tax-exempt market, the current system has produced an isolated and exclu-
sively domestic bond market that excludes access to trillions of dollars of assets. In contrast,
other industrial countries allow domestic and foreign corporations, banks, pension funds, and
individual investors to participate in financing public investment. A broadening of the mar-
ket would not only make assets available; it would also lead to the stable institutional over-
sight characteristic of taxable and global bond markets so that the potential for unfortunate
scandals such as the Orange County bankruptcy would be reduced.
Regan and his associates have developed a new security concept, the American global infra-
structure security, to overcome the weaknesses they see in the current system. By decoupling
and then selling separately the two components of the municipal bond—tax exemption and
income flow—the AGIS becomes competitive in two separate markets: investors who seek
primarily tax sheltering and those who seek yield. As a result of the “stripped” tax-exemption
privilege, the effective interest rate for the issuer would be reduced, compared to the current
rates, and the federal subsidy would be closer or equal to the federal tax loss.Public Policy Brief 6 6
American taxpayers undoubtedly know that their states and cities help
pay for sports stadiums. But how many fans know that, thanks to tax-
exempt bond financing, up to a third of their subsidy winds up in the
hands of investors in high tax brackets rather than in the stadium itself.
A Congressional Research Service study estimates that, for every $225
million stadium, the federal Treasury loses an average of $70 million in
f o rgone tax collections to the purchasers of these tax-exempt bonds
(Zimmerman 1996, 9–10).
Rarely is it asked whether there are better ways to finance sports facili-
ties. And it is doubtful that more than a handful of taxpayers are aware
of how this subsidy operates, for the subject of tax-exempt municipal
bonds is highly complex and is rarely discussed in the popular press.1 It
works this way. By exempting interest payments on municipal debt from
federal income taxes, the federal government lowers the cost of borrow-
ing to state and local governments. Purchasers of municipal bonds are
willing to accept a lower rate of interest because they receive intere s t
payments that are tax free.
The subsidizing of state and local expenditures is justified because these
bonds, in most cases, finance beneficial and worthy public pro j e c t s —
roads, bridges, schools, and water systems—that produce economic and
social benefits for the communities in which they are undertaken and
which spill over to other jurisdictions. This is why, in addition to the
federal tax-exempt subsidy, there are numerous direct federal grants for
these infrastructure projects.
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There are, however, drawbacks to the current form of the tax-exemption
given to municipal bonds. When a state or local government sells a tax-
exempt bond, a substantial portion of the federal subsidy never reaches
the issuing government. The Congressional Research Service study indi-
cates that thirty-five cents of every dollar coming out of taxpayers’ pock-
ets is diverted into the pockets of investors in the highest tax brackets.
Another drawback is that the current system excludes commerc i a l
banks, public and private pension funds, foundations, and endow-
ments—with assets of trillions of dollars. In contrast, other countries can
make full use of private domestic and global capital markets to finance
their public facilities. A federal subsidy of state and local infrastructure is
appropriate and clearly needed, but the current form of tax-exemption
d i s t o rts the function of capital markets. Eliminating this distort i o n
would unlock the trillions of dollars of potential bidding assets and
would eliminate the transfer of wealth from ordinary taxpayers to high
tax bracket investors. 
Tax exemption was long thought to be anchored in the U.S. Consti-
tution; the Constitution was interpreted to mean that the federal gov-
ernment was blocked from taxing state activities. In 1988, however, the
Supreme Court reached a different conclusion: in South Carolina v. Baker
it held that municipal tax exemption is not protected by the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity and can be altered through normal fed-
eral legislative processes.2
This holding and the growth of pension and bond funds and global
capital markets stimulated a search for alternatives to traditional tax-
exempt bonds to overcome their inefficiency and inequity. I and a
g roup of municipal bond experts—Peter Imhoff and Mark Mayer, cur-
rently of the investment banking firm Wa r b u rg Dillon Read, and
Eugene W. Harper Jr. and Jeff rey L. Piemont, currently of the law firm
S q u i re, Sanders & Dempsey—developed a new security concept, called
the American global infrastru c t u re security or AGIS. The AGIS bond
involves stripping the tax-exempt privilege from a tax-exempt bond,
thus making the bond taxable, and selling the tax-exempt privilege
separately (somewhat similar to the way low-income housing tax cre d-
its are sold) in the financial markets. Under this system the issuer
would get the full subsidy it should be receiving and for which the
average taxpayer is paying.A New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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The AGIS concept needs to be tested. Hundreds of municipal jurisdic-
tions are hard pressed for revenues, even in a booming economy. For
them, the present system, though flawed, provides a needed subsidy.
They and all other state and local governments would not want to
change unless it could be documented that they would not lose any of
the benefits and privileges they now have and that their subsidy would
actually be improved.
T h ree recently proposed federal programs suggest a framework for a
pilot program to test the validity of our proposal. Rep. Charles B.
Rangel (D–N.Y.) has introduced the Public School Mod e rnization Act
of 1999 (H.R. 1660); Rep. Jennifer Dunn (R–Wash.) has introd u c e d
the Highway Innovation and Cost Savings Act (H.R. 869). It has been
re p o rted that the vice pre s i d e n t ’s office is working with Sen. Max
Baucus (D–Mont.), of the Committee on Environment and Public
Works, on legislation for environmental projects. All these pro p o s a l s
expand the scope of existing tax benefits in connection with the
issuance of municipal bonds: The public school and environmental pro-
posals involve stripping tax credits from the principal payments on
bonds; the highway proposal is intended to provide tax-exempt financ-
ing for privatized toll roads. Because they are themselves one-time test
p rograms, these proposals could be adapted to include the AGIS. Or,
the AGIS proposal could be adapted, in a pilot program fashion, 
to cover a major, but limited, sector such as transportation, health care ,
or housing.
This paper first explains why investment in infrastructure by state and
local governments is necessary. It then explains why the tax-exempt
municipal bond has not worked well. Finally, it presents the AGIS solu-
tion to the problem. The appendixes provide a technical explanation of
the efficiency of the tax exemption and a short history of municipal
bonds.
The Need for Sta te and Local Inve stment in Infra st ru c t u re
G o od public infrastru c t u re improves prod u c t i v i t y, strengthens econ-
omies, and in the process makes for better quality of life. Bro a d l y
defined, infrastructure includes roads, bridges, and other transportation
8I n f r a s t ru c t u re Financing with the AGIS Bond
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facilities; drinking water, sewage, and other environmental facilities; and
schools, public utilities, hospitals, universities, and other facilities for
public use. No one doubts that the building, constant maintenance, and
replacement of infrastru c t u re are essential and that these are tasks for
state and local governments. 
Most of the money that states and municipalities spend on infrastructure
is raised by issuing tax-exempt municipal bonds. Tax exemption helps to
lower state and local governments’ cost of borrowing. If the tax-exempt
market did not exist, all municipal borrowing would have to take place
in the regular “taxable” markets—the traditional capital markets that
a c c o m m odate U.S. Tre a s u ry and corporate (and occasional municipal)
borrowing and where interest costs are approximately 15 to 20 percent
higher than in the tax-exempt markets (U.S. General Accounting
Office 1995, 15). The magnitude of the subsidy to state and local gov-
ernments depends on the timing of the bond issuance and the vagaries of
i n t e rest rates. For example, since 1990 the average spread in intere s t
rates between long-term tax-exempt municipal bonds and taxable
Treasury bonds has been 87 basis points (or 0.87 percent),3 but at many
times during this decade state and local governments were paying inter-
est on tax-exempt bonds at rates higher than the interest rates on tax-
able Treasuries in other years. The narrowing and widening of the
differential is a natural feature of the securities market. 
How much infrastructure investment is needed? For transportation facili-
ties alone, the Department of Transportation estimates that we need to
invest $16 billion more than what is currently spent annually on high-
ways, $10 billion more on airports, and $13 billion more on transit (cited
in Shuster 1997). The DOT estimates that, of the 42,000 highway fatali-
ties each year, up to 30 percent are caused by unsafe roads and bridges
(Goodrich 1997). A study released by the Surface Transportation Policy
Project (1997) estimated the cost to American drivers of poorly main-
tained roads at $4.8 billion annually in car repairs. The report found that
58 percent of urban, suburban, and interstate highways are in fair to poor
condition and more than 26 percent need repair now or will need it
soon. Even if these estimates are high, they confirm our perception that
more spending on infrastructure would be desirable. 
9A New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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A number of academic studies in the early 1990s tackled the question of
the appropriate amount of investment through macroeconomic esti-
mates of the effects on economic growth of investment in public capital
projects. The studies produced widely varying findings, except for those
focused on individual industries.4 The Federal Highway Administration,
for example, found that the manufacturing sector as a whole realizes sig-
nificant cost savings from good transportation networks through savings
in inventory costs, adequate distribution systems, and access to larg e r
input and labor markets (Keane 1996). The administration also found
that recent highway investments yielded significantly positive rates of
return in that sector. Transportation infrastructure also plays a positive
role in the communications, public utilities, and retail trade and services
industries. A study conducted by Regional Financial Associates showed
that regions that invested more than the national average in infrastruc-
ture experienced better than average job growth, and regions that spent
less had less job growth (Bleakley 1997).
The message has apparently been heard in state capitols and city halls.
Many municipalities use investment in infrastructure as a lure for corpo-
rate plant and office relocations. The period of reduced spending in
infrastructure appears to be over. Spending rose in the 1990s after stag-
nating throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Infrastructure investment as a
p e rcentage of total nonresidential construction increased to an annual
average 24 percent in the 1990s, compared to an average 19 percent in
the 1980s (Bleakley 1997).
P roblems with Tax Exe mption of Municipal Bonds 
Transfer to High Tax Bracket Investors
The tax exemption on income from municipal bonds is a subsidy pro-
vided to states and municipalities by the federal government by exempt-
ing interest payments to bondholders from federal income taxes. The
total revenue lost by the federal Treasury as a result of the exclusion of
i n t e rest on all outstanding state and local bonds was estimated to be 
$22 billion for fiscal year 1998;5 the exclusion of interest ranked as theI n f r a s t ru c t u re Financing with the AGIS Bond
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eighth largest federal revenue loss incorporated in the income tax rules
(Executive Office of the President 1997, Tables 5-1, 5-6).
The problem is not that the federal government subsidizes infrastructure
c o n s t ruction—we believe it should—but that this is a poor way to go
about it. While the federal government forgoes an estimated $22 billion
in tax collections each year in order to provide the subsidy, state and
local government units collectively save only an estimated $14.7 billion
on their interest costs. The remainder is picked up by middle-income
and wealthy investors. The loss of subsidy to states and localities and the
amount siphoned off by investors are not intentional outcomes of tax
legislation; no law was ever passed allowing individuals to share in the
infrastructure subsidy. 
To understand why this occurs, we must examine how the tax exemp-
tion operates (a theoretical formula is given in Appendix A). Begin
with a “taxable” bond from the alternative marketplace for municipal
b o rrowing. We estimate that from 1986 to 1995 an average interest rate
on taxable bonds (including both Tre a s u ry and corporate bonds) was
8.3 perc e n t .6 An investor in the top tax bracket of 39.6 percent would
be indiff e rent between purchasing a taxable bond yielding 8.3 perc e n t
i n t e rest from which 3.3 percent of the interest would go to taxes (8.3  x
39.6 = 3.3 percent) and a tax-exempt bond yielding 5.0 perc e n t .
Assuming all else equal, the taxable bond at 8.3 percent (on which the
investor pays an explicit tax of 39.6 percent to the federal govern m e n t )
p rovides an after-tax yield equivalent to that of a tax-exempt municipal
Box 1 Muni Bond Markets: Facts and Figures
Municipal bond markets in the United States are broad and active. The total
outstanding tax-exempt debt in 1997 was about $1.3 trillion. Of the ro u g h l y
$173 billion in new issues of long-term municipal bonds in 1997, 83 perc e n t
(or $144 billion) were tax exempt; the remainder were classified as taxable or
subject to the minimum tax. Local governments and their authorities issued
60 percent of municipal bonds in 1997; state governments and their agencies
issued the re m a i n d e r. A New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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bond priced at 5.0 percent (on which the investor pays an i m p l i c i t tax of
39.6 percent in the form of reduced interest). On a tax-exempt bond
issued at 5.0 percent, the municipal government would save 3.3 perc e n t
in borrowing costs over a comparable taxable bond, while the federal
g o v e rnment would lose 3.3 percent in tax collections. As far as taxpay-
ers are concerned, the federal subsidy of municipal borrowings would be
a wash. However, what happens in the marketplace is not so straightfor-
w a rd. The actual average interest rate on The Bond Buyer’s 2 0 - b o n d
index of tax-exempt municipal bonds between 1986 and 1995 was 6.8
p e rcent (The Bond Buyer 1997a,b). 
The reason is this. Most individuals holding municipal bonds are in rela-
tively high tax brackets.7 However, the amount of municipal borrowing
each year outstrips the capacity and willingness of high-bracket taxpay-
ers to invest in fixed-income securities such as municipal bonds. So
issuers must increase the interest coupon from what it would take to
attract the high-bracket taxpayers to a yield that will attract also taxpay-
ers in lower brackets (Michael 1990, 1672). Thus, although a dispropor-
tionate share of long-term tax-exempt bonds is held by the investor in
the highest tax brackets, the interest rate is determined by the marginal
investor who is in a lower bracket (estimated by various analysts as low
as 15 percent; see Michael 1990).
Taxpayers in lower tax brackets re q u i re higher yields on tax-exempt
bonds in order to switch from taxable investments. An investor in the
28 percent tax bracket would need a tax-exempt interest rate of 6.0 per-
cent to receive a yield equivalent to that of a taxable investment at 8.3
percent. A taxpayer in the 15 percent bracket would require a rate of 7.1
percent. 
As the yield on municipal bonds rises to attract lower-bracket investors,
investors in the higher tax brackets reap ever larger windfalls. For each
6.8 percent bond purchase by an individual in the 39.6 percent tax
bracket, the federal government loses 3.3 percent in tax collections, but
the municipality saves only 1.5 percent in costs. What happens to the
missing 1.8 percent? It accrues to the rich bond purchaser who receives
6.8 percent interest instead of the 5 percent at which the bond would
have been issued had there been sufficient investors at that rate. (BondI n f r a s t ru c t u re Financing with the AGIS Bond
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purchasers in intermediate tax brackets also gain and the federal govern-
ment loses taxes on them, but proportionately less so.) Average taxpay-
ers nationwide are the ones paying for these windfalls to the wealthy. 
The total dollar amounts involved are significant. On the approximately
$144 billion in new long-term tax-exempt municipal bonds issued in
1996, using the same average interest rates as above, state and local gov-
ernments saved about $2.2 billion in interest costs. Assuming an average
tax bracket of 28 percent, the federal revenue loss was about $3.3 billion,
of which $2.2 billion constituted the subsidy to the municipalities and
the remaining $1.1 billion went to investors. Applying the same ratios to
the $1.3 trillion of outstanding municipal debt and the 1998 projected
federal revenue loss of $22.0 billion, municipalities will benefit by $14.7
billion and $7.3 billion will go to investors. Thus the historical method
of financing state and local public works can be faulted on two grounds.
The subsidy is highly inefficient, with a third of the federal expenditure
never reaching its intended recipient, and the inefficiency is associated
with an inequitable transfer of wealth from the average taxpayer to the
wealthy bondholder.
Exclusion of Potential Assets
A second problem with the current tax exemption lies in the composi-
tion of the market for municipal bonds. The tax exemption has pro-
duced an isolated and exclusively domestic municipal bond market,
which excludes large institutional investors with their huge pools of cap-
ital. Table 1 shows how the composition of investors in the municipal
bond market changed in the aftermath of the U.S. Treasury and IRS rul-
ings and the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which changed the tax treatment of
institutional holdings of tax-exempt bonds. As a result—and given the
fact that pension funds have never participated—the municipal bond
market is patronized by few large institutional investors, which would
ordinarily exercise oversight of market practices. 
The 1986 act closed several tax-exemption loopholes and re q u i red intere s t
on all municipal securities to be entered into corporations’ computation of
their minimum tax (God f rey 1995). As a result, corporations and commer-
cial institutions, especially banks, significantly divested themselves ofA New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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municipal bonds, an ironic consequence of the re f o rm in light of banks’
historical interest in being “good citizens” in their communities and their
involvement as stable investors in municipal bonds. Simultaneously, the
combined holdings of individual households and mutual and money mar-
ket funds increased. By 1995 about three quarters of outstanding munici-
pal bonds were held by individuals or their proxies (mutual funds and bank
personal trusts). 
Table 1 Investors in Municipal Debt (Percentage)
1985 1995
Households 40.5 34.2
Commercial banks 27.3  7.4
Mutual and money market funds 8.3 26.1
Insurance companies 11.4 13.4
Bank personal trusts 5.6 8.0
Pension funds 0.0 0.1
Other 6.9  10.8
Source: The Bond Buyer (1997b).
Pension funds, another appropriate source of capital for public invest-
ments, have always been in effect barred from the tax-exempt bond mar-
ket. Their fiduciary role imposes an obligation to maximize re t u rn, so
with a wide choice of investments available, they do not invest in lower-
yielding tax-exempt bonds to achieve a benefit (tax exemption) they
already have. With assets of over $8 trillion, pension funds represent the
l a rgest single investment pool in the country (The Conference Board
1996, 15). They are currently invested in virtually every other re c o g-
nized asset class, such as stocks, bonds, real estate, and venture capital,
in both the United States and abroad.
In other industrial countries the pension funds are often active partici-
pants in infrastru c t u re financing, through bond purchases and thro u g h
loans to local or central governments. Of the ten largest pension funds
in the world, six are public pension funds (“P&I/InterSec World 300”
1995), and all six are strong players in infrastru c t u re investment (see
Box 2). The lesson is clear. In many industrialized countries, if public
pension funds have the opportunity to invest in infrastructure, they do
so, sometimes quite extensively. They recognize it is a wise investment
that also responds to community needs.
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The local community interest expressed in foreign pension funds’ infra-
structure investment highlights an apparent lack of such concern in U.S.
public pension portfolios—a condition often taken advantage of by
politicians. For example, governors of large states have sometimes tapped
pension funds to balance their budgets. Politicians and social activists
may pre s s u re state pension funds to invest in “economically targ e t e d
investments” (ETIs), such as below-market housing projects and business
s t a rt-ups that did not obtain conventional financing. Although some
studies show that average re t u rns on ETIs are acceptable, many states
have lost money on them. Suffice it to say, ETIs are not a standard asset
class with historical re t u rn and credit rating measurements and would
likely disappear from portfolios if the public funds could buy taxable
state and local bonds with good credit ratings and interest payments
above Tre a s u ry yields. Additionally, aggressive bidding for such bonds
would undoubtedly help bring down government interest costs.9
B ox 2 F o reign Pension Funds and Public Investment
Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds in the Netherlands, the second larg e s t
pension fund in the world, invests 37 percent of its assets in government loans
or bonds, a substantial amount of which goes toward public infrastructure such
as water projects, highways, and railroads. In Japan, premiums from the four
“national annuities” (public pension funds), which rank in the top 10 pension
funds worldwide, are collected and pooled at the Ministry of Finance and then
invested in securities and loans, mostly for public works and housing loans.
The Swedish Allmanna Pensionsfonden, seventh largest pension fund in the
world, invests massively (46 percent of its assets) in housing projects, most of
which receive direct government subsidies.
Several foreign pension funds are also poised to participate in private-public
p a rtnerships. Privatization was introduced into British infrastru c t u re financing
in the early 1980s; hundreds of projects are now under development and are bid
under the Private Finance Initiative. Commercial banks are currently the main
s o u rce of financing for these projects, but pension funds appear interested in
assuming both senior and subordinated debt for PFI projects. Canadian pension
funds are similarly ready to become involved in infrastru c t u re, mostly thro u g h
obtaining equity in companies that invest in infrastru c t u re .8A New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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Lack of Stable Institutional Oversight
With a historical default rate of less than 1 percent, municipal bonds
have long had healthy credit ratings and public sector issuers and the
municipal bond market have operated in exemplary fashion (God f re y
1995).10 However, in the opaque municipal bond market, public sector
borrowers do not face the same probing oversight as do corporate bor-
rowers, which operate in the spotlight cast by large financial institutions
and the global capital markets.
In the past few years there have been some ethical scandals in connec-
tion with municipal bond offerings. Several prominent securities firm s
have been charged with conspiracy and fraud, some state and local gov-
ernments and their underwriters have been investigated by the SEC for
arbitrage abuses, and the IRS is reportedly conducting audits regarding
the use of private-activity bonds.
The lack of oversight is no better illustrated than in the singular, but
well-publicized billion-dollar bankruptcy of Orange County, California.
There were several public suggestions in advance of the bankruptcy that
the actions of a particular investment officer were putting the county in
a precarious financial position. Intervention by a responsible community
of financial lenders (which might have included such powerhouse 
institutions as Calpers, the California pension fund, and the Bank of
America) might have saved the situation. Instead, the Orange County
“financial community” consisted of widely scattered individuals and a
few bond funds, and the bankruptcy occurred.
Public officials and underwriters (most of whom are highly ethical, pro-
fessional individuals) and the taxpayers that support them would benefit
f rom institutional investor oversight. The Wall Street Journ a l re c e n t l y
speculated that the goal of the SEC arbitrage abuse investigations was to
bring the municipal industry “closer to the standards of other U.S. capi-
tal markets” (cited in Beckett 1997). Allowing state and local govern-
ments to enter those markets is the direct route to achieving that
noteworthy goal.I n f r a s t ru c t u re Financing with the AGIS Bond
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D e f e r red Maintenance  
One practice over which institutional investors might exercise oversight
if they could purchase infrastru c t u re bonds is deferred maintenance.
Some governors and mayors freely admit they “raid” the maintenance
budgets, transferring the funds to more visible projects. Roads are even-
tually fixed, but only through major reconstruction, costing the taxpay-
ers far more than ordinary maintenance.
Institutional investors, especially local pension funds, might well insist on
p roper maintenance, first, to protect their investment and, second, 
as a service to their communities. They could insist on maintenance
covenants, such as those included in bonds for some toll roads and bridges
in this country and in Euro p e .1 1 A maintenance covenant is a simple con-
tract between a state or local government and the purchaser of its bonds
stating that the government will adhere to routine maintenance schedules
established by engineers or architects. Some covenants also re q u i re annual
public re p o rts on adherence. These covenants are easily drafted and
e n f o rced; if a covenant is breached, the bank trustee has the authority to
e n f o rce the adherence, for example, by seeking a court decre e .
A Solution: The AGIS Bond 
While the tax exemption of municipal bonds allows the needed subsidy
to get to state and local governments, it suffers from controversy, prob-
lems, abuses, and only partially successful attempts at restricting the
damage through legislation and federal regulation. State and local gov-
ernments have always opposed any major alteration of this much needed
subsidy process. Their opposition is understandable in view of the alter-
natives that have been proposed in the past (see Appendix B), most of
which would have made the subsidy subject to the vicissitudes of federal
policy and budgeting and therefore subject to eventual elimination.
The AGIS bond is a promising approach to more efficient operation of
the municipal bond market.1 2 The idea is to create a taxable bond for
sale in the regular capital markets, but one that contains a special 
tax-exempt benefit that can be “stripped” from the bond and sold sepa-
rately to investors who are interested in tax sheltering but do not wish
Public Policy Brief 17A New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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to buy a long-term municipal bond or interests in a municipal bond
mutual fund.
T h e re is some precedent for the AGIS bond; for example, the low-
income housing tax credit is sold in a similar manner. In effect, the state
or local government offers for sale both a taxable bond and associated
tax benefits. The purchasers of the tax benefits, who would presumably
be looking for ways to lower their taxes, would receive an annual exclu-
sion from gross income equal to what would otherwise be the tax-exempt
interest on the bond and would pay a price based on the after-tax present
value of a stream of future annual exclusions. They would apply against
their annual taxable income an amount equal to the associated tax bene-
fits. Municipalities would use the money they receive from the sale of
the tax benefits to reduce the principal amount of bonds required to be
issued to finance the desired level of capital expenditures.
The AGIS market would not supplant the tax-exempt market; the tax-
exempt market would remain as an alternative and a check on the effi-
ciency of the new process. Presumably, most state and local governments
would ultimately recognize that it is in their interest to offer AGIS
bonds rather than tax-exempt bonds because the issuer of AGIS bonds
retains the full value of the federal subsidy instead of paying out approxi-
mately a third to wealthy bond purchasers. As a result of the stripped tax
benefit, the effective interest rate to the issuer would be reduced, com-
p a red to current municipal rates, and the federal subsidy would thus
approach or equal the federal tax revenue loss.
How does the AGIS bond eliminate the inefficiency associated with the
tax-exempt municipal bond? By separating the two components of the
municipal bond—tax exclusion and a fixed-income government secu-
rity—the AGIS bond is competitive in two separate markets. Instead of
t rying to accommodate the much more limited group of investors that seek
both components together, the AGIS bond sells a tax exclusion to people
seeking a tax shelter and sells the cash flow to those seeking interest (and
principal repayment) income through long-term fixed-rate securities.
Recall that the reason for the inefficiency of tax-exempt bonds is the
i n s u fficient number of buyers in the highest tax brackets to purchase all
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the municipal bonds available for sale. Taxpayers in the highest brack-
ets might want the tax exclusion but often do not want to tie up their
funds in fixed-income securities or an equivalent bond fund. As a re s u l t ,
the interest rates off e red on tax-exempt municipal bonds must rise to
attract lower-bracket investors. With the AGIS bond, that is no longer
the case.
Decoupling the two components of the municipal bond also opens up
the municipal bond market to a universe of interest-income seekers, not
just U.S. pension funds and banks but foreign pension funds and global
investors, who might well be interested in stable U.S. securities backed
by state and local governments. Competitive bidding among these
n u m e rous investors could lower interest rate costs even further to the
issuing governments and their taxpayers.
How are the major players likely to react to this approach? State and local
g o v e rnments should be expected, upon successful completion of pilot 
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Box 3 An AGIS Bond Issue
How would an AGIS bond issue work in practice? Suppose the State of New
York wished to raise $100 million through a 30-year bond issued at a tax-
exempt rate of 5.9 percent (an average market tax-exempt rate). That would
provide purchasers with $5.9 million interest that is exempt from federal taxes
a n n u a l l y. Now suppose the state offers a 30-year AGIS bond. Think of the
AGIS bond as having two “coupons,” which go to two separate groups of
investors. Investors seeking tax shelters pay roughly $21 million for the tax-
benefit coupons, which yield a stream of $5.9 million annually in the form of
exclusion from income over the next 30 years. Investors seeking intere s t
income pay roughly $79 million for the cash-flow coupons, sold at discount
from the $100 million face value because the actual interest on these bonds is
taxable. 
The State of New York would receive the full $100 million payment, at an
effective payable interest rate lower than 5.9 percent because the tax benefit
would be bid down to an efficient level—the benefit to the highest marginal
rate taxpayer. The exact price to the investors and the exact interest rate
would be determined by underwriters in an iterative, computer-assisted process
and would depend, among other things, on market interest rate levels and the
spread between taxable and tax-exempt rates at the time.A New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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p rograms, to favor this approach since it reduces their costs or, at least,
leaves them no worse off than the tax-exempt market. Municipalities
retain the federal subsidy, they obtain the full subsidy instead of the cur-
rent partial subsidy, and they retain full control over decisions related to
the bond issuance. Meanwhile, the tax-exempt market is left intact and
s e rves to make sure that investors seeking the tax exclusion are offering a
fair price for AGIS bonds. 
Also, with the implementation of a stripped tax benefit, state govern-
ments and those local governments that have an income tax might be
expected to begin taxing the interest on their own municipal bonds.13
This would make their borrowings consistent with the national level,
generate additional income for them, and ensure that in-state public
pension plans could invest in their bonds. 
At the federal level, reactions might be mixed. The Treasury is generally
hesitant to create additional forms of tax benefits. However, unlike other
tax-benefit transfers, the AGIS proposal would reduce or eliminate
windfall gains, thus improving the efficiency and equity of the existing
system. It will allow more infrastructure construction with the same sub-
sidy. Moreover, it would not substitute a direct cash subsidy, which might
have an impact on the budget appropriation process. On the other hand,
t h e re may be some concern in Congress that the AGIS bond would
encourage even more bond issuance (a laudable outcome if it results in
beneficial infrastructure investment), thereby raising costs to the federal
government.
Among the public, there may be some concern about the symbolism of a
new tax-exclusion security marketed to high-bracket taxpayers. The fact
is, though, that the highest tax brackets are already reaping a windfall;
with the AGIS approach, they would at least be paying for the benefits
they currently receive gratis. The real beneficiaries of the AGIS bond
are the ordinary taxpayers who have been transferring approximately a
third of the subsidy into the pockets of the wealthy.
Within the bond market, large investment houses are likely to approve
of the AGIS. However, smaller ones, especially small regional securities
firms, might find that it runs counter to their financial interest in main-
taining the municipal bond market as an isolated, domestic market.
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The standard capital markets in this country are deep and liquid, with
tens of millions of dollars of taxable bonds traded every day. Yet concerns
about the size and liquidity of the municipal segment of that market are
legitimate. In the first few years that state and local governments issue
taxable bonds, will potential buyers be reluctant to bid, fearing that if
they wished to trade, the market might be too “thin” to respond quickly
at realistic prices?
Several factors militate against this. Approximately 50 percent of new
bond issues are enhanced by municipal bond insurance, creating, in
e ffect, an easily understood AAA credit (The Bond Buyer 1997a); this
should considerably ease even a major influx of taxable municipal bonds
into the market. Enough taxable municipal bonds have already been
issued, for a variety of reasons, to create what appears to be a reasonably
vibrant alternative market. As of September 1997, $46 billion in taxable
municipal bonds were outstanding in the market and eligible to be
traded.14 In June 1997, the State of New Jersey brought the largest tax-
able municipal bond issue ever offered to the market. The $2.8 billion
issue was snapped up and enthusiasm for the bonds was so strong that
the state was able to offer a lower interest rate than it had planned
(Pulley 1997). There is thus little doubt that a major and fully efficient
taxable municipal bond market could bloom, even as the tax-exempt
municipal bond market continued to exist.
C o n c l u s i o n
This paper does not argue against favorable tax treatment of municipal
bonds, only against the current form of the exemption. The AGIS bond
proposal would work more efficiently and equitably. It would: 
• Open the here t o f o re isolated and exclusively domestic municipal
bond market to a large array of domestic and foreign individual and
institutional investors in the regular domestic and global capital
markets
• Increase the number of bidders and thereby produce a more compet-
itive market for municipal securities, which is likely to reduce inter-
est rates, bringing down government costs for infrastructure
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• C reate institutional investor and capital market oversight of the
issuing governments and municipal bond offerings
• A s s u re that the full federal subsidy goes to state and local govern-
ments, instead of a third of it being siphoned off by wealthy taxpayers
• Allow municipalities (state and local executives and legislatures) to
retain full control over the timing and costs of bond offerings
With the emergence of large pension funds, entry of private firms into
infrastructure financing, and several municipal bond scandals, the argu-
ments against the current form of tax exemption of municipal bonds
have never been so strong; with the Supreme Court’s finding against its
constitutional protection, the legal argument for maintaining it has
never been so weak. Federal legislation to allow a test of AGIS bonds
would begin to tackle a long-standing inefficiency in the municipal bond
market and move that market in a healthy direction.
Appendix A: Inefficiency of Ta x - E xe mpt Municipal Bonds
Most of the inefficiency and inequity associated with the tax exemption
relates to individual investors and their proxies, who hold the bulk of
municipal bonds. The tax effects on institutional investors would require
a more complicated analysis of the tax shifting of the burden of paying
taxes between the institutions involved and their customers and is not
analyzed here. (An additional source of distributional inequity is at the
c o m m u n i t y, rather than the individual investor, level. Communities
with more affluent citizens are more likely to demand higher levels 
of public services; their higher levels of borrowing are subsidized by all 
taxpayers.15)
The inefficiency and inequity can be expressed in economic terms in the
formula used by Mussa and Kormendi (1979):
W = T – S = ( t – tm) • ic • M
where
W = total windfall gain to holders of tax-exempt municipal bonds
T = total tax loss to the Treasury because of the exemption
22I n f r a s t ru c t u re Financing with the AGIS Bond
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 23
S = total reduction in borrowing costs enjoyed by state and local 
governments as a result of the exemption
t = average marginal tax rate of municipal bondholders
tm = (ic – im)/ic = implicit tax rate on tax-exempt municipal bonds
ic = nominal yield on taxable corporate bonds
im = nominal yield on tax-exempt municipal bonds
M = dollar value of the outstanding stock of tax-exempt 
municipal bonds
A c c o rding to Mussa and Kormendi, however, this standard analysis is
flawed because it assumes a zero rate of inflation. In fact, the inefficiency
is smaller at any positive rate of inflation because the real effective tax
rate paid by bondholders increases as the inflation rate increases. Thus,
the proper formula should read:
WHe = (He – tem) • rc • MH
where 
WHe= true measure of windfall gain to holders of tax-exempt 
municipal bonds
He = effective real tax rate of municipal bondholders
tem = real implicit tax rate paid by municipal bondholders
rc = real yield on taxable corporate bonds
MH = real value of outstanding stock of tax-exempt municipal bonds
Writing in 1979, when inflation averaged 6 percent annually, Mussa and
Kormendi found that while the nominal implicit tax rate on municipal
bondholders  averaged  about  30  percent,  the  real  effective 
tax rate averaged over 70 percent, nullifying any possibility of a tax
i n e q u i t y. Inflation rates in the 1990s, however, are substantially lower
than in the late 1970s. 
A key factor in estimating the inefficiency of the exemption is estimat-
ing the average marginal tax rate of municipal bondholders. Analysts in
the 1960s and 1970s applied a rate of 42 percent in their calculations;
Mussa and Kormendi estimated a lower rate, 36 percent, because of the
availability of alternative tax shelters to which bondholders could shift
their money if tax-exempt bonds were not available. Reflecting a tax
23rate stru c t u re closer to the contemporary one, Feenberg and Poterba
(1991) estimated a weighted average marginal tax rate of 28.7 percent
on household holdings of tax-exempt debt. 
These formulas are necessarily a simplification of the true situation
because the value of tax-exempt bonds is determined not only by the
federal tax rate but by state and local personal income tax, capital gains
tax, and intangible property tax policies. The value of the tax exemption
has declined over the years as the tax rate schedule has been compressed.
In general, the larger the spread between taxable and tax-exempt inter-
est rates, the smaller the inefficiency of the tax concession.
Appendix B: A Short Histo ry of Municipal Bonds and At te mpts to
E l i m i n a te Their Tax Exe mpt i o n
I n t e rg o v e r nmental Tax Immunity
Since the early 1800s, states and localities have issued bonds to finance
capital improvements made necessary by continued population gro w t h
and urbanization. Following the financial collapse of 1837 and a series of
state defaults in the 1840s, many states adopted constitutional re s t r i c-
tions on the amount and purpose of state, and later local, government
borrowing. 
Tax exemption was based on the federal constitutional doctrine of inter-
g o v e rnmental tax immunity. During the nineteenth century limits on
the ability of the federal government to impose taxes that interf e re d
with the borrowing power of states were established in a series of
S u p reme Court decisions (Zimmerman 1991, 41–43). In Collector v.
Day,16 the Court held that the federal government could not subject the
salaries of state judicial officers to the income tax first enacted in 1861.
The strongest statement of tax immunity came following reenactment of
the income tax in 1894, which was quickly challenged and judged
unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan Trust Co.1 7 Although the
primary issue was apportionment of the tax among the states, the Court
found the federal income tax unconstitutional also because it would tax
i n t e rest on state and local debt: “The tax in question is a tax on the
A New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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power of the States and their instrumentalities to borrow money, and
consequently repugnant to the Constitution.” 
In 1913 the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, removing the barrier to
federal income taxation caused by the apportionment clause. Although
the amendment gave the federal government the power to tax income
“ f rom whatever source derived,” there was an implicit understanding
that interest on state and local obligations would not be taxed. The
exemption of interest on state and local bonds was stated explicitly in
the income tax legislation of 1913.
Nevertheless, the validity and wisdom of the tax exemption was ques-
tioned by federal officials. In 1921 Tre a s u ry Secre t a ry Andrew Mellon
wrote quite colorfully that the “existence of this mass of exempt securi-
ties constitutes an economic evil of the first magnitude” and called for
elimination of the tax exemption, a call echoed in 1938 by Pre s i d e n t
Franklin D. Roosevelt in a message to Congress (Zimmerman 1991, 43).
In 1923 the House of Representatives passed a constitutional amend-
ment to authorize the taxation of income derived from future issues of
municipal securities, but the Senate voted against it. In the history of
Congressional action on this issue, 
Virtually every Secretary of the Treasury . . . has favored removing the
exemption feature. Public finance experts have repeatedly attacked it,
and volumes of testimony before congressional tax committees have
been heard in connection with its repeal. Despite this rather concerted
opposition, Congress has some six times defeated proposals to remove
the exemption, and on many more occasions such proposals have
never reached a vote. (Ott and Meltzer 1980, cited in American
Enterprise Institute 197318)
In 1988 there was a dramatic shift in the legal climate when the Supre m e
C o u rt in South Carolina v. Baker e ffectively limited the federal govern-
m e n t ’s ability to place restrictions on tax exemption, such as the re s t r i c-
tions embodied in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.
The decision then went further and made it clear that “The owners of
state bonds have no constitutional entitlement not to pay taxes on
income they earn from the bonds, and States have no constitutional enti-
tlement to issue bonds paying lower interest rates than other issuers.”1 9
A New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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This decision eliminated the constitutional protection for municipal
securities. In reaction, several state legislatures passed resolutions calling
on Congress to voluntarily restrict its own powers to collect taxes on state
and local securities. 
Taxable Bond Option (TBO)
Since the 1930s the concept of a taxable bond option (TBO) has been
advanced as a way to eliminate the inefficiency of the federal tax-exemp-
tion of municipal bonds while retaining federal reimbursement of state
and local governments for the loss of the tax exemption. Under most of
the proposals, the federal government would give to the municipalities
that portion of the tax-exempt subsidy they would normally get, but
would keep the portion of it (about 35 percent) that has been flowing to
high-bracket taxpayers. Some TBO proposals would re q u i re taxable bond
financing by state and local governments; others would allow them to
chose between taxable and tax-exempt bonds. TBO proposals since the
1960s include the following (American Enterprise Institute 1973):
• Sen. William Pro x m i re (D–Wis.) introduced a bill in 1968 that
would have created a nonprofit corporation to provide a federal
guarantee for taxable municipal bonds and authorized subsidies of up
to a third of the interest charges on those bonds. 
• The Johnson administration introduced a bill in 1968 that would
have given states and localities an incentive to issue only taxable
bonds for water pollution control facilities by committing the fed-
eral government to provide an interest subsidy of up to 25 percent
on such bonds. 
• Under pressure of tax reform hearings held by the House Ways and
Means Committee in 1969, the National Governors Confere n c e
developed a “dual coupon” proposal. The federal government would
pay a percentage (say, 50 percent) of the interest costs of taxable
bonds to be issued by state and local governments. Each taxable
bond would bear two coupons; one coupon payable by the U.S.
Treasury and the other coupon payable by the issuer of the bond. (In
this proposal, unlike other taxable bond options, the bondholders
essentially determine the timing of the federal interest payments by
deciding when to redeem the coupons.)I n f r a s t ru c t u re Financing with the AGIS Bond
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• In 1970 Congress took action on three bills authorizing federal sub-
sidies for certain municipal projects, such as rural water and sewer
facilities, if the projects were financed with taxable municipal
bonds. 
• Several bills were introduced in 1972 and 1973 that would have
provided a flexible subsidy of 40 to 50 percent if state and local gov-
ernments issued taxable bonds.
• The House Ways and Means Committee reported a bill in 1976 that
proposed a 35 percent interest subsidy on taxable municipal bonds
(Connor 1994). 
Why did all of these proposals fail to pass? The primary reason was oppo-
sition by state and local governments, who feared that a taxable bond
option would be the first step toward eliminating tax-exempt bonds
entirely. Direct federal subsidies of taxable municipal bonds would be a
temporary measure that could be rescinded some years down the road.
F u rt h e rm o re, even if such subsidies continued, municipal officials did
not want to see their federal subsidies tied to the federal budget process. 
We might also speculate that there was little impetus to pass the TBOs
or other alternative means to finance infrastru c t u re because the pro b-
lems with tax exemption discussed in this paper had not yet developed.
Pension funds were small and not considered as potential significant
p u rchasers of municipal bonds; devolution of government activities to
the private sector was hardly conceptualized, much less practiced; and
t h e re had been no municipal bond scandals of sufficient scope to pro-
duce a call for institutional investor oversight. 
Other Alternatives to Tax Exemption of Municipal Bonds 
The TBO is not the only suggested approach to eliminating the prob-
lems associated with tax exemption. In 1994 Rep. Richard Gephard t
(D–Mo.) and Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D–Conn.) introduced a bill that
incorporated the recommendations of the 1993 Commission to Promote
Investment in America’s Infrastructure. The bill would create two types
of “public-benefit” bonds: type A bonds to cover transportation and
environmental infrastructure facilities that are currently tax exempt and
type B bonds to cover public-purpose infrastru c t u re facilities, whether
privately or publicly owned. The idea was to retain and extend the taxA New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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exemption for all public-purpose infrastructure, regardless of ownership,
thus stimulating private sector activity in developing, modernizing, and
purchasing infrastructure facilities. 
The Gephard t - D e L a u ro bill would allow defined-contribution pension
plans invested in mutual funds to purchase public-benefit bonds and
would allow re t i rees to exclude from taxation the interest income
received on those bonds (“Administration Weighs Taxable Bond Plan”
1994). As a result, public-benefit bonds would bear interest rates compa-
rable to those of current tax-exempt municipal bonds (Poole 1995).
S i m u l t a n e o u s l y, this proposal would make investment in infrastru c t u re
attractive to pension funds. 
Another approach, off e red by Robert Poole of the Reason Foundation, is to
level the playing field between private and public ownership by re m o v i n g
the tax exemption for infrastru c t u re facilities that are essentially self-
s u p p o rting business enterprises, whatever their ownership (Poole 1995).
This class of “business infrastru c t u re” would include airports, energy facili-
ties, electric and gas utilities, environmental facilities, highways, bridges,
tunnels, ports, solid waste facilities, transportation facilities, and water and
wastewater treatment facilities.
P o o l e ’s elimination of the tax exemption would apply only to those
municipal bonds that are specifically designated as infrastru c t u re re v e n u e
bonds (about a third of all tax-exempt bonds, or approximately $50 bil-
lion, annually). Poole notes that state and local governments might even
be able to reduce interest rates on the remaining new issues of municipal
bonds as a result of the increased demand and their reduced supply. Lower
i n t e rest payments, in turn, could offset the increase in interest these gov-
e rnments would pay on infrastru c t u re bonds. Federal taxpayers would save
t h rough fewer tax-exempt bonds and thus the reduced transfer of benefits
to wealthy taxpayers. In addition to the positive effects on federal tax re v-
enues, this approach removes barriers to infrastru c t u re privatization. 
The Public Finance and Infrastru c t u re Investment Act, which would
have established a new type of tax-exempt private-activity bond, was
i n t roduced in Congress in 1993 but did not pass. The Clinton administra-
tion re p o rtedly considered including in its FY 1996 budget a plan to let
state and local governments issue taxable bonds subsidized by the federal
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g o v e rnment  through  direct  payments  to  states  and  localities
(“Administration Weighs Taxable Bond Plan” 1994). Proposals decades
ago had sought to achieve the same goal (Rabinowitz 1969). The Selzer
plan in 1941 called for the federal government to pay a fixed pro p o rt i o n
of the annual interest payments of local governments. A Tre a s u ry
D e p a rtment committee suggested in 1943 that the Tre a s u ry redistribute to
states and localities the revenue collected from taxing new municipal
bond issues. A suggestion was made in 1944 that an Interg o v e rn m e n t a l
Loan Corporation be established with a revolving fund to lend to local
g o v e rnments at the federal borrowing rate plus a service charge. The Ly l e -
Fitch tax credit proposal in 1950 involved a tax credit that would equalize
the after-tax yield on corporate and taxable municipal bonds, allowing
municipal bonds to sell at lower before-tax yields than corporates.
In the 1997 debates over the reauthorization of ISTEA (Interm od a l
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act), Congress considered a $10 bil-
lion federal program of loan guarantees and lines of credit designed to
leverage infrastru c t u re investment by states, cities, and industry. The
p rogram was amended by Sen. John Chafee (R–R.I.) to exclude tax-
exempt municipal bonds from the program because of the additional
costs to the Treasury (Stanton 1997a).
Abuses and Restrictions: Arbitrage and Private-Activity Bonds  
Although Congress did not pass any of the proposals to eliminate tax
exemption, a series of abuses in the 1960s and 1970s led federal legislators
to enact restrictions on the issuance of tax-exempt municipal debt.
Beginning in 1968, Congress sought to curb abuses stemming from two
s o u rces: arbitrage activities and private-activity bonds. 
The arbitrage restrictions in the 1986 Tax Reform Act were intended to
stop the practice by municipalities of investing the proceeds of tax-
exempt bonds not in public works construction but in higher-yielding cor-
porate or Tre a s u ry bonds. A municipality would issue tax-exempt bonds
for a construction project that would be purposely delayed for months or
even years and in many cases eventually canceled. If the project was can-
celed, the municipality would, of course, refund the bonds, but in the
meantime it would have earned the arbitrage, that is, the diff e rence inA New Approach to Tax-Exempt Bonds
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i n t e rest rates between the two types of bonds (Apogee Research, Inc.
1993, 32). Some colleges and universities with substantial endowment
funds also engaged in arbitrage, financing their capital needs with endow-
ment funds and investing their subsidized tax-exempt bonds to earn tax-
able yields (Davie 1996, 3). This practice amounted to a grant from all
federal taxpayers to a municipality (or other institution) that manipulated
the market. Under the restricted rules, issuers must rebate to the federal
g o v e rnment any arbitrage profits they earn or restrict the investment yield
on the proceeds of the bonds to the yield on the bonds.
The most widely reported abuses of tax-exempt financing have come in
the area of industrial revenue bonds (IRBs) and industrial development
bonds (IDBs) and their use to finance projects intended primarily for the
benefit and profit of the private sector. Approximately a third of out-
standing municipal debt2 0 consists of bonds that have been issued for
private-activity projects, including such things as pollution contro l ,
sewage and waste disposal facilities, student loans, low-income housing,
airports, docks, and sports and convention facilities. Some of these pro-
jects have broad-based social and civic value; others are special interest
c a rve-outs. Some, such as student loan bonds and mortgage re v e n u e
bonds, fall in the middle.
Because of the way the laws were written, corporations with a large num-
ber of geographically dispersed facilities, such as retail and fast-food
chains, could make good use of IRBs and IDBs. McDonald’s, for exam-
ple, financed 32 new restaurants in Pennsylvania and Ohio in 1979; 
K - M a rt used $220.5 million of IRBs to open 96 stores in 19 states
between 1975 and 1980 (Congressional Budget Office 1981, 23); and by
1983 Wal-Mart had been issued over $100 million in tax-exempt bonds
(“Bond Lobbyists March Again” 1983).
The uses and abuses of private-activity bonds were largely halted by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. However, circumventing the private-activity
restrictions is still eminently possible, as shown by the continued abuse of
tax-exempt financing for building sports stadiums. A study of stadium
financing by the Congressional Research Service estimated that on a
hypothetical $225 million stadium price tag (comparable to stadiums
being built in the 1990s in Chicago, Denver, Cleveland, and Milwaukee),
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financed entirely with 30-year tax-exempt bonds, the loss to the Tre a s u ry
ranges from $47.1 million to $94.2 million, depending on interest rates
( Z i m m e rman 1996, 9–10). In 1997 Senator Daniel P. Moynihan
( D – N . Y.) proposed banning the use of tax-exempt bonds for stadium
financing. His proposal was denounced by the U.S. Conference of Mayors
as a dangerous precedent for federal intrusion into state and local financ-
ing (Marois 1997).
Ack n owl e d g m e n t s
I would like to thank three people who played key roles in the writing of
this brief. Eugene Harper, Esq., not only developed the concept of the
American global infrastru c t u re security, he edited many drafts of the
brief, wisely advising me every step of the way. Ajit Zacharias, the editor
of the brief at the Levy Institute, became a municipal bond expert of
high order and his comments and editing clarified important sections of
the brief. Gilah Langner aided me, as she has in the past, with superb
writing and research.
Note s
1. This paper uses the standard terminology by which municipal bonds and the
municipal bond market (muni bonds and market) refer to the financing of
state and local governments and their agencies and authorities and of other
facilities such as public hospitals and universities. Municipalities may be used
as a collective term referring to the municipal bond issuers.
2. 485 U.S. 505, 1357 (1988). See Appendix B for a brief history of municipal
securities.
3. Comparison of Revenue Bond Index to 30-year Treasury Bonds from January
1990 to January 1997, courtesy of J.P. Morgan.
4. For example, David Aschauer (1997) found that “for most of the United
States during the 1970s and 1980s, the actual levels of public capital were
below the levels which would have maximized the rate of prod u c t i v i t y
growth.” Robert Krol (1997), citing a study by Morrison and Schwartz, notes
that “once the marginal cost of raising public capital funds is taken into
account, the net social benefits from additional public capital in the United
States is close to zero.”
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5. A recent estimate by the Joint Committee on Taxation puts the total federal
revenue loss from 1998 to 2002 at $140 billion due to the tax exemption of
municipal bonds. See Stanton (1997b).
6. Calculated as the simple average of rates on 30-year Treasury bonds and 30-
year AAA bonds.
7. Among the 3 million individuals who reported receiving tax-exempt interest
in 1994, 71 percent had an adjusted gross income of $50,000 or over, and 
15 percent reported an adjusted gross income of $200,000 or over (Internal
Revenue Service 1996, Table 2.1). The data re p o rt receipt of tax-exempt
interest. 
8. Based on data from the following sources: Allmanna Pensionsfonden, 1995
Annual Report; Marcel Fleugels, Public Affairs Department, Algemeen
B u rgerlijk Pensioenfonds, private conversation, Febru a ry 7, 1996; To m o k o
Fujii, Tokyo Economic and Market Analysis, Salomon Brother Asia Limited,
memo, August 21, 1995;  David Gibson, Ontario Teachers Pension Plan, pri-
vate conversation, March 14, 1996; David Gye, Morgan Stanley, memo to
Sir David Walker, “Tax-exempt Bonds,” January 3, 1996.
9. Paul Williams, vice-president of research and investment strategies at John
Nuveen & Co. believes that state pension funds could ultimately account for
25 to 40 percent of the municipal market (reported in Heap 1995).
10. According to the Public Securities Association, between 1980 and 1991 the
municipal bond market had an average annual default rate of 0.4 perc e n t ,
c o m p a red to 5.5 percent in the corporate bond market. A re p o rt by J.J.
Kenny Co. found that between 1980 and 1991 only 53 municipal bond issues
defaulted out of 69,656 that were rated (cited in “Muni Bonds’ Best Bet”
1994, H1).
11. One example in the United States is the 1993 trust agreement, Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority and Shawmut Bank, N.A., as Trustee, March 1.
12. I am indebted to Messrs Imhoff, Mayer, Harper, and Piemont for this section.
13. All states except the District of Columbia already tax out-of-state municipal
bonds.
14. Data from Muniview Municipal Database provided by Christian Anthony,
J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc., September 1997.
15. Metcalf (1991) points out that it is not the case that higher income commu-
nities reap greater benefits from tax exemption because they tend to have
higher credit ratings and thus lower borrowing rates.
16. 11 Wall. 113 (1871).
17. 157 US 492 (1895).
18. Ott and Meltzer (1980) cite an article by Lucille Deick (1946) that lists 114
resolutions introduced between 1920 and 1943 to reduce the subsidy.
19. 485 US 505, 1357 (1988).
20. Based on 1992–93 Census of Governments data cited in Davie (1996, 
Table 2).
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